British Cabinet Conference on Ireland

Introduction from Chronology

British leaders (Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Churchill, Greenwood, Anderson, Wilson, Macready, Tudor, Boyd & Strickland) meet in conference. This is the first full-scale British cabinet conference on Ireland since July – see Dec-29 to 30-20.

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Macready says that, from a military point of view, the situation in Ireland is improving. He tells the meeting that he has applied for an extension of martial law to four more counties – Kilkenny, Clare, Waterford and Wexford. (This request is sanctioned at a British cabinet meeting on December 30th and proclaimed on January 5th - see Jan-05-21/ 2.) Tudor says, that from a policing perspective, the situation has also improved.

There followed a discussion on the arrest of “people of political importance” with particular reference to the arrest of Arthur Griffith. The minutes state “In decisions which had a political complexion the Chief Secretary should be consulted”. There then followed a discussion on the discipline of the RIC and, to a lesser extent, the BA with particular reference to the burning of Cork (see Dec-11-20/1). Strickland’s report, which allocates the blame to the Auxiliaries, is discussed and gets support from Greenwood. Tudor puts up a lame defence but all that happens is that he gets the equivalent of a rap over the knuckles from Llyod George.

There is a long discussion on the merits and demerits of a truce (without the surrender of arms by the IRA). Llyod George was concerned that, if a truce was declared, would it hold. He referred to the killing of Canon Magner (see Dec-15-20/1) and said that “Those were the type of incident that drove a country like the United States to do something beyond discretion”. He asked Tudor and Strickland if they were confident if they could keep their men in hand. Tudor said that his commanding officers were “getting the men under better control”.

Macready said that if “there was a cessation of outrages on the part of the Sinn Feiners” and if thought politically desirable then a truce without arms would not cause any great problem. He did point out that, without ongoing raids, the intelligence machinery of the Crown Forces would suffer. Anderson, Tudor and Boyd expressed similar fears and opposed a truce. They were supported by Bonar Law who says that any interval of a truce “would undoubtedly be used by the Sinn Feiners to re-establish their system of communication throughout the country”.

Llyod George then asked that, if there were no truce, how long would it be “before the extremist gang of the Sinn Feiners was entirely broken?”. He pointed out that the “Home Rule Act might come into operation any time in February, and the North was anxious to get it working at once”. He asked the opinion of his military officers “If there were an election in the South of Ireland, say, in February or March: would there be any intimidation?” Macready says that there “would be a general boycott at the point of a pistol, on the Michael Collins”. Llyod George pointed out that “if Michael Collins could stop three million people using their vote, it is not say much for the success of the policy that His Majesty’s Government was pursuing”. Macready replied that “he thought that terror would be broken if martial law was spread all over the country”.

Strickland was of the opinion that there would be “definite and decisive results in four months’ time”. Tudor also argues that, in his area, “in four months’ time the terror will be broken if there is no truce. The great hope of the extremists was a change of policy”. Boyd says that “four months was not too optimistic a prophecy”. Wilson said that in his opinion a truce would be absolutely fatal. Wilson also argues for the extension of martial law over the whole of Ireland.

The minutes of this meeting are given in Kautt (2014), pgs 232-236.

On December 30^th, the British cabinet instructed the Chief Secretary Greenwood to start the machinery of setting up the Northern Ireland parliament. Elections for the southern and northern parliaments set for May 1921.

Archbishop Clune is informed, after this meeting, that all prospect of a truce had been closed. A week later, he publicly blamed the failure of the peace negotiations on the British government’s demand for a surrender of arms.

Boyce agrees with Clune saying that “it was the [British] Cabinet’s insistence upon a surrender of arms by the I.R.A that caused the peace negotiations … to end in failure”. However, looking at the bigger picture, Fanning notes that “Peacemaking was a casualty of these Ulster-oriented policy priorities [of the British cabinet]”. He gets support for this proposition from Llyod George’s framing of the question of truce or no truce within the context of the “Home Rule Act” and that the “North was anxious to get it working at once”.

What is tragic is that six and a half months later, a truce was put forward by the British cabinet without the surrender of arms but with over 1,000 deaths due to the on-going conflict in the meantime.

It should be pointed out that the BA generals (plus Tudor) turned out to be wildly optimistic about “definite and decisive results in four months’ time”. It is also worth noting how sensitive Llyod George was to opinion in the United States. In particular, he was sensitive to the type of incident in Ireland that “might create unpleasantness with the United States, where feeling was dangerous”.

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