Cumman na nGaedheal Meeting
Introduction from
Chronology
In the Dáil, Cosgrave reads the
letter of March 6th from Tobin and Dalton and describes the
ultimatum as “a challenge to the democratic foundations of the State”.
Mulcahy reports to the Dáil that
officers in Roscommon, Gormanstown, Baldonnel and Templemore had absconded with arms but that
the only area that was possibly in danger was County Cork. Chief of Staff
Sean MacMahon is sent to Cork where he prevents any
armed action.
A long Cumman
na nGaedheal meeting also
takes place to discuss the Old IRA position.
More Detail
At this meeting, McGrath states that mutiny was a faction fight
between the Old IRA and the IRB. He said he tried to be a bridge between
the two groups but failed. He goes onto say that the government had misinterpreted
the March 6th letter from Tobin and Dalton saying that all they
wanted was a meeting “to discuss what they considered a departure from the real
Treaty position”.
Valiulis points out that McGrath ignored that a
number of meetings had taken place between the Old IRA and government ministers
since the previous summer and she goes on to say that “More importantly,
it glossed over the fact that the mutineers were demanding power within the
army and threatening armed rebellion if the government did not
acquiesce”. However, in the letter of March 6th, the Old IRA were seeking
power within the army but there is no explicit threat of armed rebellion.
There is rather the ominous threat to “take such action that will make clear to
the Irish people that we are not renegades or traitors to the ideals that
induced them to accept the Treaty”. It does go on to say that “Our
Organisation fully realises the seriousness of the action that we may be
compelled to take, but we can no longer be party to the treachery that
threatens to destroy the aspirations of the Nation.” Therefore, while
Tobin and Dalton may not be threatening armed rebellion, by any measure, they
are engaged in serious insubordination.
McGrath tries to justify their
action by saying that “the rebellious officers were old friends, former
comrades … and hence could not be expected to adhere to a strict disciplinary
code”.
Mulcahy did not intervene
extensively in the party debate. Valiulis
suggests that this may have been because (1) he did not want to discuss army
affairs at a party meeting; (2) he did not want to reveal the extent of
discussions with the mutineers since last summer or (3) there were current
discussions with the mutineers which he did not wish to jeopardise.
McGrath later said that that it was agreed at this meeting that “That the men
concerned in the recent trouble in the Army undertake to undo, so far as they
can, the mischief created by their action, and on their so doing the incident
will be regarded as closed.” However, this was disputed by others
present, in particular O’Higgins.
One effect of the mutiny was to
strengthen the hand of those within the cabinet (such as O’Higgins and Hogan)
who wanted changes to the army, particularly to get rid of the influence of the
IRB, especially among GHQ staff.