Meeting between Llyod George and Collins
Introduction from Chronology
Llyod George meets Collins at
9.30am. At this meeting Llyod George would seem to have convinced Collins
that the Boundary Commission would provide for the essential unity of Ireland.
At the end of this meeting, Llyod
George asked to meet an Irish delegation in the afternoon. Collins would not commit but agreed to let
“the appointment stand tentatively”.
More Detail
Llyod George said to Collins that he
needed a reply to the question on whether they were “within or without” the
Empire. However, Collins brought the
discussion round to Northern Ireland and that he was “perfectly dissatisfied”
with the British proposals especially “with the positon
on the North East”.
Collins later wrote in a memorandum on
this this meeting that Llyod George said that Collins himself had pointed out
that [with a revised boundary] “the North would be forced economically to come
in”. Collins said that he wanted “a
definite reply from Craig and … was agreeable to a reply rejecting as
acceptable” because rejection would mean the establishment of the boundary
commission which “would save Tyrone, and Fermanagh, parts of Derry, Armagh and
Down”. Collins went away from this
meeting under the impression that Llyod George agreed with him as to what would
result from the proposed Ulster clauses in the Treaty, especially the clause on
the Boundary Commission.
As to why Collins convinced that with
the Boundary Commission “the North would be forced economically to come in”
(especially with the loose wording of the boundary commission clause), Matthews gives one possible answer. He says that the boundary commission
clause in the Treaty did not stand alone and added that “Both Griffith and
Collins were sure that Craig’s government would find itself slowly strangled by
the financial restrictions of the 1920 Act.”
If this is the case, then they were to be disappointed if they believed
that the British would, as they said they would, stick by the financial
restrictions of the 1920 Act.
However, despite not disagreeing with
Collins, according to Matthews, Llyod George was to tell his cabinet colleagues
(at a cabinet meeting which started at midday later on December 5th) that the
Boundary Commission would provide for nothing more than “a readjustment of the
boundaries”.
Also, according to Kenny, at this
meeting the British Cabinet was told that “the division of opinion which had
manifested itself among the Irish Representatives in London, also existed in
the Irish Cabinet (UK National Archives CAB 23/27/16. P. 215).
Fanning goes further. Speaking of Llyod
George’s encouraging Collins expectations that Northern Ireland would be forced
economically to join the rest of Ireland at their meeting on the morning of
December 5th, Fanning goes on to note that “the next day, within hours of
signing the treaty, he boasted to his cabinet that ‘boundary commission might
even give the north more than she might lose’ ”.
Fanning refers to Lord Riddell and says: “It is a classic example of
what Lord Riddell … meant when he warned that ‘you cannot rely on what L.G.
says … He may not actually tell a lie, but he will lead you to believe what he
considers will induce you to do what he wants.’ ”.