Belfast Riots in July 1920

Background and Consequences

The immediate causes were the shooting of Colonel Smyth in Cork on July 17th (he was from Banbridge, Co. Down) and the tensions arising from the 12th July (fanned by Carson).  There was also the recent local elections in which the unionists were perceived as being the major losers thus heightening unionist fears.

The longer term causes were fears about job losses among Protestant workers.  Parkinson notes that unemployment was 26% in Belfast at this time due to the post-war depression.  Protestant workers felt they were taking their ‘own’ jobs back.  According to the official history of the BA’s 5th Division “There was great dissatisfaction in the Belfast shipyards owing to the continued employment there of Catholics from the south of Ireland who had come north during the war to take the place of Ulster men who had enlisted. These last felt justly aggrieved that their place were not kept open for them on their return to civil life.” (Sheehan (2009), pg 50).  It would seem from this statement that the British Army were in sympathy or, at least, very understanding of the “Ulster men” attacking Catholics and ‘rotten Prods’, beating them and in some cases killing them. 

Parkinson says there was about 93,000 Catholic workers in the city at this time (Parkinson (2004), pgs 33-35) and he estimates that around 10,000 workers were expelled including several hundred female textile workers.   He says that most of the expulsions occurred within the first few days but some intimidation did occur into the following month and even into early September when Catholic workers would be forced out of work for refusing to sign ‘loyalty’ oaths.  Also, included were about 1,800 Protestant trade unionists and socialists who were also expelled from their work – the latter were called ‘rotten Prods’ by the unionist leadership (Parkinson (2004), pgs 35-36 & 328).  Parkinson further estimates that over the period of the conflict in Belfast (i.e. up to summer 1922), over 20,000 Catholics were displaced (Parkinson (2004), pg 62).  

Parkinson also says that there is little evidence that Unionist Party had organised expulsion but that the Unionist leaders failed to condemn them.  Discussing the background to the expulsion of Catholics and ‘rotten Prods’ from their workplaces and the subsequent riots, Parkinson says “Whilst direct Unionist Party involvement in the subsequent industrial expulsions was unlikely, the reluctance of its leaders to condemn the blatant intimidation or to intervene in a proactive manner against those responsible … unquestionably gave them moral support” (Parkinson (2020), pgs 27-28). McDermott comes to a similar conclusion “There is no significant evidence that the unionist leadership ordered the expulsions from the shipyards … but … the expulsions mark the beginning of what … the whole of the nationalist community called the ‘pogroms’.” (McDermott (2001), pg 33).  Carson was later to express his ‘pride’ in the actions of his shipyard ‘friends’ (Parkinson (2004), pg 31).  In the British House of Commons on July 22nd, far from condemning the illegal actions of the expulsionists, he makes excuses for them (Parkinson (2020), pg 28). 

Parkinson goes onto say “members of the BPA [Belfast Protestant Association] and other loyalist splinter groups undoubtedly benefited from easy access to their considerable arsenal and were certainly responsible for the initial industrial expulsions and several sectarian murders.  Although the unionist establishment may not have co-ordinated the campaign of violence, it is undeniable that the Belfast authorities had been bracing themselves for an outbreak of communal disturbances during the summer of 1920.” (Parkinson (2004), pg 309).  He goes on to say that the more incisive deployment of British troops in Belfast would have probably reduced the level of violence.  Mitchell takes up this issue “No serious effort was made to employ the military to do more than stop the rioting. Nothing was done to restore the thousands of Catholics to their homes and jobs.  The blow struck in Belfast suited the British government’s policy of crushing the rebellion in Ireland with any and all means. Much has been made of the utter irresponsibility of that government in its employment of the Black and Tans in the rest of Ireland but its indifference to what happened in Belfast is an even more serious blot on its record.” (Mitchell (1995), pg 168).

 

The response by a number of prominent nationalists and republicans in the North (including Sean McEntee; Denis McCullough; Bishop McRory and Rev John Hassan) was, in August, to set up a ‘Belfast Boycott Committee’ which aimed to force Belfast businesses to take back expelled Catholic workers by pushing a vigorous boycott of all goods produced in Belfast. 

They have success with county councils in the South.  The Dáil is initially reluctant to become involved – see Aug-06-20/2 but the Dáil cabinet (see Aug-11-20/2) and the Dáil itself agree to a limited form of Belfast Boycott (see Sep-17-20/2).  Eventually, the Dáil agrees to a wider boycott – see Jan-25-21/1 - and the cabinet make it a key part of its Northern policy January 1921 - Jan-1921/6. .

 

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