Belfast Riots in July 1920
Background and Consequences
The immediate causes were the shooting of Colonel Smyth in Cork on
July 17th (he was from Banbridge, Co. Down) and the tensions arising
from the 12th July (fanned by Carson). There was also the
recent local elections in which the unionists were perceived as being the major
losers thus heightening unionist fears.
The longer term causes were fears about
job losses among Protestant workers. Parkinson notes that unemployment
was 26% in Belfast at this time due to the post-war depression.
Protestant workers felt they were taking their ‘own’ jobs
back. According to the official history of the BA’s 5th
Division “There was great dissatisfaction in the Belfast shipyards owing to the
continued employment there of Catholics from the south of Ireland who had come
north during the war to take the place of Ulster men who had enlisted. These
last felt justly aggrieved that their place were not kept open for them on
their return to civil life.” (Sheehan (2009), pg 50). It would seem from this statement that the
British Army were in sympathy or, at least, very understanding of the “Ulster
men” attacking Catholics and ‘rotten Prods’, beating them and in some cases
killing them.
Parkinson says there was about 93,000 Catholic workers in the city
at this time (Parkinson (2004), pgs 33-35) and he
estimates that around 10,000 workers were expelled including several hundred
female textile workers. He says that most of the expulsions
occurred within the first few days but some intimidation did occur into the
following month and even into early September when Catholic workers would be
forced out of work for refusing to sign ‘loyalty’ oaths. Also, included
were about 1,800 Protestant trade unionists and socialists who were also
expelled from their work – the latter were called ‘rotten Prods’ by the
unionist leadership (Parkinson (2004), pgs 35-36
& 328). Parkinson further estimates that over the period of the
conflict in Belfast (i.e. up to summer 1922), over
20,000 Catholics were displaced (Parkinson (2004), pg
62).
Parkinson also says that there is little evidence that Unionist
Party had organised expulsion but that the Unionist leaders failed to condemn
them. Discussing the background to the expulsion of Catholics and ‘rotten
Prods’ from their workplaces and the subsequent riots, Parkinson says “Whilst
direct Unionist Party involvement in the subsequent industrial expulsions was
unlikely, the reluctance of its leaders to condemn the blatant intimidation or
to intervene in a proactive manner against those responsible … unquestionably
gave them moral support” (Parkinson (2020), pgs
27-28). McDermott comes to a similar conclusion “There is no significant
evidence that the unionist leadership ordered the expulsions from the shipyards
… but … the expulsions mark the beginning of what … the whole of the
nationalist community called the ‘pogroms’.”
(McDermott (2001), pg 33). Carson was later to express his ‘pride’ in
the actions of his shipyard ‘friends’ (Parkinson (2004), pg
31). In the British House of Commons on July 22nd, far from
condemning the illegal actions of the expulsionists,
he makes excuses for them (Parkinson (2020), pg
28).
Parkinson goes onto say “members of the BPA [Belfast Protestant
Association] and other loyalist splinter groups undoubtedly benefited from easy
access to their considerable arsenal and were certainly responsible for the
initial industrial expulsions and several sectarian murders. Although the
unionist establishment may not have co-ordinated the campaign of violence, it
is undeniable that the Belfast authorities had been bracing themselves for an
outbreak of communal disturbances during the summer of 1920.” (Parkinson
(2004), pg 309). He goes on to say that the
more incisive deployment of British troops in Belfast would have probably
reduced the level of violence. Mitchell takes up this issue “No serious
effort was made to employ the military to do more than stop the rioting.
Nothing was done to restore the thousands of Catholics to their homes and
jobs. The blow struck in Belfast suited
the British government’s policy of crushing the rebellion in Ireland with any
and all means. Much has been made of the utter irresponsibility of that
government in its employment of the Black and Tans in the rest of Ireland but
its indifference to what happened in Belfast is an even more serious blot on
its record.” (Mitchell (1995), pg 168).
The
response by a number of prominent nationalists and
republicans in the North (including Sean McEntee; Denis McCullough; Bishop McRory and Rev John Hassan) was, in August, to set up a
‘Belfast Boycott Committee’ which aimed to force Belfast businesses to take
back expelled Catholic workers by pushing a vigorous boycott of all goods
produced in Belfast.
They have success with county councils in the South. The Dáil is initially reluctant to become
involved – see Aug-06-20/2 but the Dáil cabinet (see Aug-11-20/2) and the Dáil
itself agree to a limited form of Belfast Boycott (see Sep-17-20/2). Eventually, the Dáil agrees to a wider
boycott – see Jan-25-21/1 - and the cabinet make it a key part of its Northern
policy January 1921 - Jan-1921/6. .