British Cabinet Conference on
Irish Situation
Introduction from Chronology
First full-scale conference between the British cabinet and the
Irish Executive – many historians see this conference as the point at
which the British decided to enforce a policy of coercion in Ireland rather than
one of entering discussions with Sinn Féin
More Detail
Among those present were Lloyd George (PM); Andrew Bonar Law
(Conservative Leader and Lord Privy Seal); Austen Chamberlain (Chancellor of
the Exchequer); Winston Churchill (Secretary of State for War); Arthur Balfour
(Lord President of the Council); Hamar Greenwood (Chief Secretary for Ireland);
Walter Hume Long (First Lord of the Admiralty); Herbert Fisher (President of the Board of Education); Field Marshall Viscount French (Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland), Lord
Birkenhead (Lord Chancellor); George Curzon (Foreign Secretary); James Graig (in what capacity?), Nevil Macready (GOC British Army
in Ireland); Major General Hugh Tudor (Police Adviser in Ireland); John Anderson (see May-22-20/1); James
McMahon (see May-22-20/1); Andy Cope (see May-22-20/1) and William Evelyn Wylie
(Legal Advisor to Dublin Castle).
(Was Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, there?)
Wylie presented two papers with the options of coercion or
negotiations with Sinn Féin.
Coercion would entail “Martial Law of the most stringent
kind”. His opinion was that
this was not a solution because “once lifted, the feeling of bitterness
and hatred among the Irish towards Britain would intensify and conditions would
return to the present strife”. He argues for negotiations
with Sinn Féin. He said that
they should drop the Government of Ireland Act in favour of Dominion Home Rule i.e. autonomy for Ireland within the Empire. He is backed by Anderson and
McMahon. Curzon points out that
“This programme of mingled coercion, plus the Government Bill, meant that
there would be no real attempt to settle the Irish Question for six
months.” (As Fanning points out, “Twelve months would have been a
better estimate”.)
Tudor acknowledges that “as a police
force the RIC could not last much longer” but he said that “they
might have a great effect as a military body” and goes on to announce
that he is recruiting 500 ex-officers and a number of ex-soldiers to make
up for the resignations from the RIC [See Jul-06-20/2 and Jul-27-20/2]. He
argues for coercion and says that, with proper support, it would be possible to
crush the “present campaign of outrage”.
Two camps emerging. On
conciliation side were Macready, Greenwood, McMahon, Anderson, Cope, Wylie,
Curzon and Chamberlain. On the coercion side were Tudor, Long,
Birkenhead, Churchill, Law, Balfour and Craig. Lloyd George remained
neutral. It is significant that most of those on the coercion side were
cabinet ministers.
Lloyd George asked Tudor, if the “inconveniences” he
suggested would create the desired atmosphere whereby a settlement could be
reached with Sinn Féin - Tudor assured him that it would.
While no conclusions were recorded, it would seem that a policy of
coercion was agreed upon with their intention (hope?) of weakening Sinn
Féin and setting the conditions for negotiations in which dominion
status would be offered to southern Ireland. If this interference as to the
outcome of this meeting is correct, many people in Ireland were to suffer as a
result. According to Fanning, Llyod
George wound up the meeting by asking for “the definitive and final
proposals of the Irish Government for the enforcement of the law”.
[On another issue, during this meeting Churchill proposed raising
a force of 30,000 men in Ulster and he asked “What ... would happen if
the Protestants in the six counties were given weapons and ... charged with
maintaining law and order and policing the country”. He was attracted to this idea because, among
other reasons, it would relieve British troops for duty in the south of Ireland
and elsewhere in the Empire. Craig
says this action would prevent “mob rule” and “prevent the
Protestants running amok”. Wylie said it would lead to civil war and
Anderson said that it might lead to the massacre of Protestants in the south
and west of Ireland. See
Jul-29-20/5. Anderson was incorrect, when the ‘Specials’ were
formed, it did not lead to a massacre of Protestants in the south and west of
Ireland but the ‘Specials’ did engage in the oppression of
Catholics within the six counties which were to become Northern Ireland.]