More Detail and Comment
on the Weakening of the ‘Die-Hard’ Position within the British Cabinet
Introduction
from Chronology
Bonar Law leaves the British Cabinet due to medical advice.
Law is replaced as leader of the Conservative and Unionist Party by
Austen Chamberlain. Lesson says that that Chamberlain “apparently had not
inherited his father Joseph Chamberlain’s passion for the Union”. (Harold Macmillan much later wrote of
Chamberlain that “He was respected but never feared”.)
More Detail
Quoting Paul Canning, Fanning says that Bonar Law’s illness was “at
least partly psychosomatic” and Fanning continues, quoting Frances Stevenson
(Llyod George’s secretary), “Bonar’s plea of illness and his sudden departure …
were due to one thing only – cold feet about Ireland”. However, according to Maurice Hanky, Bonar
Law was indeed ill. Matthews says that
“It is altogether possible that both sides were correct, that Bonar Law’s
symptoms were real but were brought on because he knew that talks with Sinn
Féin could no longer be avoided. (Bonar
Law ‘recovers’ by September 1921 – see Oct-28 to 29-21/1.)
Townshend and Fanning say that, along with the retirement of Walter Long
(see Feb-13-21/6) and Carson resigning from the leadership of the UUP (see Feb-04-21/1),
Bonar Law’s departure was another blow to the 'die-hard' party (which dominated
the British Cabinet).
The ‘hawks’ were to receive a further blow by the replacement of John
French as Viceroy by Edmund Talbot (Viscount Fitzalan)
– see Apr-01-21/11. Fanning also adds
that Llyod George’s hard-line advisor on Ireland, Philip Kerr, left later in
1921 to be replaced by “the more liberal and conciliatory Tom Jones”.
Comment
Fanning notes that “Carson, Long and Bonar Law … stood down only when
the Northern Ireland parliament had been secured. Despite the consequent relaxation of the
diehard stranglehold on Irish policy, Llyod George hastened slowly, his
antennae always attuned to his inability to move further or faster than the
Conservative ministers who were the backbone of his government.” In other
words, while some ‘hawks’ had left the British cabinet, it was still dominated
by hard liners on conciliation in Ireland.
Townshend says that these changes may have weakened Tudor's position and
that he was soon getting conflicting messages from Llyod George. This is noteworthy as Tom Jones, in his
diary, wrote that when he had said to John Anderson, in mid-February, that
Bonar Law was “one of the most persistent opponents of reconciliation”,
Anderson replied that he felt Llyod George “was the person really responsible
for the policy of reprisals”. In
evidence of this, he cited the behaviour of General Tudor who, whenever he went
to London to see the prime minister, returned to Dublin “very much strengthened
in his policy”.
It is quite possible that both Townshend and Anderson are correct. Prior to the departure of a number of the
‘hawks’, it is likely Llyod George was encouraging Tudor in his policy of
repression and reprisals. After the
departure of some of the ‘hawks’ from his cabinet, it is possible that Llyod
George was sometimes encouraging and sometimes discouraging Tudor. Not for the
first or last time, it is quite likely that Llyod George could have been
playing a double game.