Collins - de Valera Pact

Introduction from Chronology

Collins and de Valera announce in the Dáil that they have agreed an election Pact with the election to take place on June 16th

 

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Among the provisions of the Pact are that existing pro- and anti-Treaty Dáil representation would provide basis for candidates (i.e. Sinn Féin would put forward a panel of candidates – 68 nominated from the pro-Treaty side and 58 from the anti-Treaty side).  The Pact envisaged a reunited Sinn Féin cabinet with a president elected by the Dáil together with five pro-Treaty and four anti-Treaty ministers.  The crucial minister of Defence would be nominated by the combined pro- and anti-Treaty IRA.

The pact is greeted with applause in the Dáil but with considerable alarm in London.  Officially, the Dáil cabinet justified it in terms of restoring order to allow the election to take place but Griffith's acquiescence was very muted, as was that of Cosgrave, O’Higgins and Blythe. (The Attorney General, Hugh Kennedy writes to the Chairman of the Provisional Government (Collins) saying “You cannot have a coalition provisional government consisting of pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty members.  Every member of the provisional government must accept the Treaty in writing.”)

As part of the Pact, it is understood that the Treaty would not be an issue in the forthcoming election.  Details of the Pact document given in Curran and Macardle.

Macardle argues for the strengths of the Pact i.e. postponement of decision on Treaty until it could be clarified nd understood; the constitution of the Free State would be published and examined; return a coalition government pledged to maintaining national unity; adult national suffrage under a revised national register.  However, Curran says that it was clever tactics by Collins – arguing he would lose little no matter which way it went.  Also, without a pact, it is very unlikely that a peaceful election could have taken place.  Curran quotes de Valera as later saying about the Pact “tho’ apparently a victory, was really a defeat for the Republic”. 

Phoenix notes that the joint-IRA action in the North and pleading from Aiken and others not to split were catalytic in producing the pact.  Garvin comments “What is striking is the republicans’ refusal to acknowledge that the voters had a right to reject a patently undemocratic conspiracy between the pro- and anti-Treaty factions of Sinn Féin to prevent a clear verdict on the Treaty”.  More immediately, Ferriter notes that, after the Pact, “Conferences on Ireland at the Colonial Office in London became even more tense”.

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