Collins - de Valera Pact
Introduction from Chronology
Collins and de Valera announce in the Dáil that they have agreed
an election Pact with the election to take place on June 16th.
More Detail
Among the provisions of the Pact are that existing pro- and anti-Treaty
Dáil representation would provide basis for candidates (i.e. Sinn Féin would
put forward a panel of candidates – 68 nominated from the pro-Treaty side and
58 from the anti-Treaty side). The Pact envisaged a reunited Sinn Féin
cabinet with a president elected by the Dáil together with five pro-Treaty and
four anti-Treaty ministers. The crucial
minister of Defence would be nominated by the combined pro- and anti-Treaty IRA.
The pact is greeted with applause in the Dáil but with considerable
alarm in London. Officially, the Dáil cabinet justified it in terms of
restoring order to allow the election to take place but Griffith's acquiescence
was very muted, as was that of Cosgrave, O’Higgins and Blythe. (The
Attorney General, Hugh Kennedy writes to the Chairman of the Provisional
Government (Collins) saying “You cannot have a coalition provisional government
consisting of pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty members. Every member of the provisional government
must accept the Treaty in writing.”)
As part of the Pact, it is understood that the Treaty would not be an
issue in the forthcoming election. Details of the Pact document given in
Curran and Macardle.
Macardle argues for the strengths of the Pact i.e. postponement of
decision on Treaty until it could be clarified nd understood; the constitution
of the Free State would be published and examined; return a coalition
government pledged to maintaining national unity; adult national suffrage under
a revised national register. However, Curran says that it was clever
tactics by Collins – arguing he would lose little no matter which way it
went. Also, without a pact, it is very
unlikely that a peaceful election could have taken place. Curran quotes de Valera as later saying about
the Pact “tho’ apparently a victory, was really a defeat for the
Republic”.
Phoenix notes that the joint-IRA action in the North and pleading from
Aiken and others not to split were catalytic in producing the pact. Garvin comments “What is striking is the
republicans’ refusal to acknowledge that the voters had a right to reject a
patently undemocratic conspiracy between the pro- and anti-Treaty factions of
Sinn Féin to prevent a clear verdict on the Treaty”. More immediately, Ferriter notes that, after
the Pact, “Conferences on Ireland at the Colonial Office in London became even
more tense”.