Formation of the
Special Constabulary
Introduction from Chronology
Dublin Castle issue an order – under the Special Constabulary Ireland
Acts of 1832 and 1914 – that a Special
Constabulary was to be created. Theoretically from loyalists all over
Ireland but they appear only in Ulster. Recruitment begins in Belfast on
1st November – see Nov-01-20/7.
More Detail
See Jul-23-20/3, Sep-02-20/1 and Sep-08-20/4 above for the background on
the creation of the ‘Specials’.
There were to be four elements A (full-time); B (part-time); C (reserve)
and CI (ex-UVF men). This Constabulary was recruited mainly from the
Ulster Volunteer Force and the Orange Lodges. The main restriction on
their use was that formally they could only proceed on armed patrol under the
command of a regular RIC officer. However, this restriction was often
ignored in practice.
Parkinson says that “financial considerations
involving the shortage of troops and regular police in Ireland as a whole, but
especially in the north, was the chief reason why this auxiliary force was
raised.”
The formation of the Special Constabulary was
opposed by General Nevil Macready – on June 18th he wrote to
Anderson saying that he wanted no part in “raising Carson’s army from the
grave”. Macready central concern was that the brutal oppression of
Catholics in NI by the Special Constabulary would spark similar actions against
Protestants by the IRA in South. Also,
John Anderson, joint Under Secretary in Dublin Castle wrote to Bonar Law on
September 2nd saying "I sincerely trust there is no foundation
for [this] rumour. You cannot in the middle of a faction fight recognise one of
the contending parties and expect it to deal with disorder in the spirit of
impartiality and fairness essential in those who have to carry out the Orders
of the Government". Even Chief of the Imperial Staff, Henry Wilson,
agreed – on September14th he wrote to Macready saying the
government’s plan was “simply inviting trouble”. (Wilson was later to change his mind – See Mar-17-22/2.)
On September 15th, the Daily
Mail [or News] suggested that the proposal to arm “well-disposed citizens”
raised “serious questions of the sanity of Government”. It also said that the
Government had abandoned any pretence of impartiality. On September 16th,
the Westminster Gazette said that
membership of the Specials Constabulary was a perfect fit for “all the eager
spirits who have driven nationalist workmen from the docks or have demonstrated
their loyalty by looting Catholic shops”.
On November 27th, the Fermanagh
Herald said that the special constables would prove to be “nothing more and
nothing less than the dregs of the Orange lodges, armed and equipped to overawe
Nationalists and Catholics”.
Joe Devlin tells Greenwood in the House of Commons
that the creation of the Special Constabulary would place the lives of
Catholics "at the mercy of opponents, armed by the British
government". On October 25th, Devlin tells
Greenwood in the House of Commons that “If I had the power … I would … organise
special constables to fight your special constables. The Chief Secretary is
going to arm pogromists to murder the Catholics … Their pogrom is to be made
less difficult. Instead of paving stones and sticks they are to be given
rifles.”
Grant notes that the formation of the USC gave the
nascent Northern Ireland government “the ability to legitimize the UVF as an
arm of the state, thereby controlling its unruly nature, while harnessing its
power”. McCluskey makes the interesting point that “In the summer of 1920
loyalist violence predominated where the balance of forces favoured the UVF,
such as Belfast, Lisburn and Banbridge or Cookstown in Tyrone. The creation of the USC facilitated the
westward spread of unionist violence.”
Reviewing their activities, Parkinson notes that
“Though the majority of Specials were not involved in controversial incidents,
it is likely that some police officers were guilty either of direct involvement
in the murder of Catholics, or else of collusion with loyalist
terrorists. Certainly the Specials became pariah
figures for many Catholics” (Parkinson (2004), pg
309). McDermott asks the question if the British government would have
countenanced an anti-Catholic pogrom in Belfast or Derry City and answers his
own question as follows: “Not deliberately perhaps, although in real terms they
were to approve what was in essence the arming of the majority against a
minority.” (McDermott (2001), pg 33)