Formation
of Specials
Grant notes that the formation of the USC gave the nascent
Northern Ireland government “the ability to legitimize the UVF as an arm of the
state, thereby controlling its unruly nature, while harnessing its power”.
Parkinson says that “financial considerations involving the
shortage of troops and regular police in Ireland as a whole, but especially in
the north, was the chief reason why this auxiliary force was
raised.” The formation of the Special Constabulary was opposed by
General Sir Nevil Macready. Also, Sir John Anderson, joint Under
Secretary in Dublin Castle wrote to Bonar Law on the 2nd September
saying "... you cannot in the middle of a faction fight recognise one of
the contending parties and expect it to deal with disorder in the spirit of
impartiality and fairness essential in those who have to carry out the Orders
of the Government". On the 15th September, the Daily
Mail suggested that the proposal to arm “well-disposed citizens” raised
“serious questions of the sanity of Government”.
Joe Devlin tells Greenwood in the House of Commons that the
creation of the Special Constabulary would place the lives of Catholics "at
the mercy of opponents, armed by the British government". On the 25th October,
Devlin tells Greenwood in the House of Commons that “The Chief Secretary is
going to arm pogromists to murder the Catholics … Their pogrom is to be made
less difficult. Instead of paving stones and sticks they are to be given
rifles.” McCluskey makes the interesting point that “In the summer of 1920
loyalist violence predominated where the balance of forces favoured the UVF,
such as Belfast, Lisburn and Banbridge or Cookstown in Tyrone. The creation of the USC facilitated the
westward spread of unionist violence.”
Reviewing their activities, Parkinson notes that “Though the
majority of Specials were not involved in controversial incidents, it is likely
that some police officers were guilty either of direct involvement in the
murder of Catholics, or else of collusion with loyalist terrorists.
Certainly the Specials became pariah figures for many Catholics” (Parkinson
(2004), pg 309). McDermott asks the question if the British government
would have countenanced an anti-Catholic pogrom in Belfast or Derry City and
answers his own question as follows: “Not deliberately perhaps, although in
real terms they were to approve what was in essence the arming of the majority
against a minority.” (McDermott (2001), pg 33)