1st meeting of Conference starts at 11.00am on Tuesday 11th
October in 10 Downing Street, London
Introduction
from Chronology
Large crowds assembled at the entrance to Downing St.
The two delegations sat across the table from each other. The Irish delegation was Arthur Griffith,
Michael Collins, Robert Barton, George Gavan Duffy and Eamon Duggan. They were
accompanied by their two secretaries: Erskine Childers and John Chartres.
The British delegation was David Llyod George, Austen Chamberlain,
F. E. Smith (Birkenhead), Winston Churchill, Hamar Greenwood, Lamar Worthington
Evans and Gordon Hewart. They were
accompanied by their two secretaries: Lionel Curtis and Tom Jones.
More Detail and Background
1. Discussions on First Day
At the first plenary meeting, Llyod George started by saying that
the British wanted to make peace but there were limitations beyond which they
could not go. [Pakenham points out that this statement “transferred [the
discussion] from the sphere of morals, where it was thought [by the British]
that the Irish would like to concentrate it” to the sphere of practical
politics where “both sides were to join in the common task of reconciling
divergent opinions. And the threat of force was hidden a long way back”
(Pakenham (1967), pg 121).]
Griffith replied “England’s policy in the past has been to treat
Ireland as a conquered and subject country. If there is a change in the policy
of subordinating Ireland to English interests, then there appears to be
possibility of peace” (Pakenham (1967), pg 121).
As Pakenham notes that there were five heads for discussion; (1) Trade; (2)
Finance; (3) Defense; (4) Ulster and (5) Crown and Empire. He notes that it was the last two issues
which “presented possibilities of insoluble conflict”.
They then discussed the British proposals of July 20th.
In particular, they discussed two of the five heads for discussion - defence
(with a focus on the defence limitations placed on the British offer of
Dominion status – see Jul-20-21/2) and trade (with Llyod George arguing for
free trade between the two countries).
The first plenary session ended at 12.35pm.
The second plenary session started at 4.00pm (later on October
11th). They again discussed trade and
it was agreed that the Irish would submit counter proposals. Also subcommittees were set up on defence,
financial relations and observation of the truce (including the treatment of
prisoners).
2. Griffith’s
Report on First Day
That night Griffith wrote to de Valera. Overall, he was optimistic saying “The
meeting of to-day has left me with the impression that the English Government
is anxious for peace” but he was aware that “the most difficult part has
yet to discussed”. De Valera wrote back
saying “You will have to pick him up soon on this ‘further than this we can’t
go stunt” (Pakenham (1967), pg 126).
3. Progress of talks
In the next almost two months, there would be seven plenary
sessions; 24 sub-conferences and 9 meetings of special committees. (In
addition, there were nine informal interviews between Tom Jones and Arthur
Griffith – sometimes accompanied by Collins or Duggan.)
4. Preparedness and Experience of the Two Delegations.
Fanning contrasts the not just the level of experience of the two
negotiating teams but also their preparedness. With regards the latter, Fanning
notes that “The length and intensity of the [British] cabinet’s debate on Irish
policy between May and September 1921 was a great source of strength to the
British delegation and above all to Llyod George” (Fanning (2013), pg
272). This internal debate meant that
the British side had a clear idea of its position and what it was willing to
offer. Their position was given in the
proposals sent to de Valera on July 20th and they deviated from them little in
the following three months of negotiations.
(Their position was summarised Tom Jones as granting Dominion status to
southern Ireland with all sorts of powers, but no Navy, no hostile tariffs and
no coercion on Ulster.)
In contrast, according to Fanning, the Irish cabinet had failed to
“undertake an exercise approximating to the British cabinet’s painstaking
evolution of a coherent negotiating strategy with clearly defined boundaries”
(Fanning (2013), pg 273). When they
arrived in London, the Irish negotiators only had Draft Treaty A (see Oct-07-21/1)
which still required much work including clauses on Northern Ireland. It also had the hazy concept of External
Association. Therefore, the Irish side
had no alternative position paper to table when, on the first morning of
negotiations, the British tabled fresh copies of July 20th proposals. Quoting Nicholas Mansergh, Fanning writes
“However much amended, the basic paper at any conference is apt to determine
the parameters of subsequent discussion.
This was to prove no exception.” (Fanning (2013), pg 279.) Boyce essentially agrees with Fanning. He wrote “the Irish delegates went to London
without any counter-proposals, without a definition of their aims and without
clear instructions about what their ‘fundamentals’ were” (Boyce (1972), pg
154). According to Pakenham, the advantages of the British delegation were
“First their experience, and as a team their negotiating calibre. Second their
unity. Llyod George directed both strategy and tactics. Certain limits had been
set him by his Conservative colleagues, but they were such as the [British]
House of Commons would have in any case imposed” (Pakenham (1967), pg 119).
With regards to experience, Fanning notes that “Churchill,
Birkenhead and, above all, Llyod George had honed their negotiating skills at
national and international level over decades” (Fanning (2013), pg 273). For example, at the Versailles Peace Conference.
In contrast, “Revolutionaries on the run, such as Collins, or [often]
imprisoned, as was Griffith … had no remotely comparable experience” (Fanning
(2013), pg 273). Adding to their
inexperience was de Valera’s puzzling decision not to lead the Irish negotiating
team – See Fanning (2013), pgs 275-276.
As they did not have a clear and worked out position, Curran and
Pakenham say that Sinn Féin’s strategy was to show a genuine desire for
agreement and dispose of as many troublesome details as possible before arguing
basic principles. See Pakenham (1967), pg 122.
For pen pictures of the British delegation see Pakenham (1967), pgs 104-110. For pen pictures of the Irish
delegation see Pakenham (1967), pgs
110-114. For pen pictures of the secretaries to the delegations see Pakenham (1967), pgs 114-119.
5. Personal Relations during the
Negotiations
With regards
to personal relations during the Treaty negotiations, according to Curran,
Griffith and Chamberlain hit it off and Llyod George and Churchill also liked
Griffith. In addition, while, at first, Griffith did not trust Llyod
George, he came to have confidence in him.
With regards to Collins, Curran says that Collins felt Chamberlain was
aloof and patronising and also, initially, he did not like Churchill. He
never trusted Llyod George. The only one to win Collins’s confidence was
Birkenhead. Again, according to Curran, Churchill was fascinated by
Collins but was repelled by his association with ‘terrible deeds’. This
is somewhat odd given the much more ‘terrible deeds’ that Churchill was soon to
be responsible for in the Middle East – see pgs 186-187 of Churchill’s
Folly by Christopher Catherwood.
Commenting on the Amritsar massacre in the British House of Commons on
July 8th 1920, Churchill said that it was an exception and “without
precedent or parallel” in the history of the British empire. However, as Satia notes “But in fact the
precedents were many, and Churchill had participated in a few himself” (Satia
(2020), pg 139).
Llyod George considered Duffy and Duggan as “pigeons for the plucking”
and soon formed an unflattering opinion of Barton. They reserved a
particular antipathy for Childers (and, it would seem, they were joined in this
by Griffith).