The ‘Die-Hards’
Introduction from Chronology
Ultra-Conservative [Die Hard] motion of censure defeated in House of
Commons by 439 to 43 (with Labour and Liberal opposition supporting
Government).
Llyod George argued that the only alternative to talks was the
imposition of terms on Ireland and suppression of dissent – before they could
get the support of the British people for this they
must be sure that they cannot be a settlement via talks.
However, according to Macardle, Matthews and
Fanning, Llyod George also promised Unionists that he would immediately take
steps to have the powers conferred on the Northern Ireland government by the
Government of Ireland Act transferred to it.
See Nov-09-21/1.
Comment on Die Hards
The Die Hards
were a group of right-wing Tories in the House of Commons and the House of
Lords. Fanning points out that, in this
parliament, they first coalesced into an organised group when they backed this
motion of no confidence in the negotiations.
Over the next nine months, five of the eight divisions forced by the Die
Hards were on Irish issues.
One of the most prominent Die
Hard was the well-connected James Gascoyne-Cecil (4th Marquess of
Salisbury). He boasted to Bonar Law that
he had inherited the “Cecil tradition of contempt for the Irish as a Celtic
Catholic race”.
Progress of Negotiations
By late October, the issues under negotiation had
become clear. The Irish delegation had abandoned neutrality and given in
on the demand for naval bases. The trade and financial issues remained
unsettled but the outline of an agreement was in sight. The key remaining
issues were the linked ones of the Crown and Northern Ireland.
Curran says that “Griffith was making tentative
concessions on Crown and Empire to win Britain’s help for unity. If the
British failed to persuade Ulster to join the South, Sinn Féin could break off
negotiations with the assurance of world sympathy and only minimal risk of
war. … The British delegates … must do their best to obtain peace
without compromising … Crown and Empire (or jeopardizing national security) and
without precipitating a Conservative revolt over Ulster. This meant
extracting the maximum concessions from Sinn Féin while cautiously exerting
pressure on Craig to secure unity. If they failed to convert Craig, the
British must still try to reach agreement with Sinn Féin on the basis of a
divided Ireland.” (Curran J M (1980), pgs
91-92)
(Llyod George wondered if the British people would
fight on Ulster (Curran J M (1980), pg 95) and
Chamberlain was sure they would not (Curran J M (1980), pg
309, n48)).
Fanning, on the other hand, says that ‘coercing
Ulster’ was anathema to Llyod George.
Fanning argues that Llyod George had real no intention of exerting
pressure on Craig – this argument would get support by the decision of the British
government to transfer further executive powers to the Northern Ireland
government - see Nov-09-21/1.