|
Nov-01-21/1
|
Griffith shows the other members of the Irish
delegation a draft of the letter of personal assurance that he was going to
send to Llyod George following their one-to-one meeting on October 30th.
The crucial clauses
were “provided that I was satisfied on every point” (including the “essential
unity” of Ireland), then “I was prepared to recommend recognition of the
Crown, the formula in which this recognition was to be couched to be arrived
at a later stage. I similarly agreed
to recommend free partnership with the British Commonwealth, the formula
defining the partnership to be arrived at in a later discussion”.
Barton and Gavan Duffy angrily protested
against the letter (and Childers more discreetly given that he was not a
member of the delegation). Their
meeting dispersed without reaching agreement.
See Nov-02-21/1
|
Curran J M (1980), pgs
96-97; Pakenham (1967), pgs 160-161
|
|
Nov-02-21/1
|
The Irish delegation meet at 9.00am to discuss
Griffith’s letter to Llyod George.
Gavan Duffy had drafted a long memorandum it
which he criticised Griffith’s letter on a number of points. Despite being irritated, Griffith agreed to
re-draft the letter.
He agreed that it should come from the full
delegation and, on the crucial issue of recognition of the Crown, he changed
the wording to “I was, on the same condition, prepared to recommend that
Ireland should consent to a recognition of the Crown as head of the proposed
Association of Free States” (This closely followed the Irish memorandum of
October 29th.)
Pakenham notes that this “change was
considerable. It substituted for the
recognition of the Crown in undefined
terms mutually acceptable to both countries, a recognition on the lines of the Irish proposal of the
29th (which it virtually reproduced). From the English point of view, this was
External Association once again raising its hydra head”. (Italics in
original.)
|
Curran J M (1980), pgs
96-97; Pakenham (1967), pgs 161-162
|
|
Nov-02-21/2
|
Griffith’s
Letter of Undertakings
Griffith and Collins meet with Birkenhead in
his office in the British House of Lords at midday to discuss Griffith's
letter (which, as noted, was now coming from the full delegation).
Birkenhead tries to get Griffith and Collins to make changes to the letter on
the Crown and Empire passages but they do not agree.
Griffith and Collins had a further meeting at
6.45pm with Llyod George and Birkenhead (and possibly Chamberlain). The meeting lasted two hours. The British
delegates got Griffith and Collins to agree to a number of changes to the
letter. The two most important were (1) the phrase describing Ireland's
association with the Commonwealth as a "free partnership with the
British Commonwealth" was changed to “free partnership of Ireland with
the other states associated within the British Commonwealth" and that he
was prepared “to recommend that Ireland should consent to the recognition of
the Crown as head of the proposed association of free States” (2) the Irish position on Ulster which
ruled out any association if unity was denied was changed to “I stated that
this attitude of mine was conditional on the recognition of the essential
unity of Ireland”.
With some effort, Griffith got the consent of
the full delegation to the changes (Barton and Gavan Duffy only giving
consent reluctantly) and it was sent to Llyod George 11.00pm on the evening
of November 2nd.
The full text of letter is given in Macardle. (Even though Griffith got the consent of the
full delegation to the letter, he still wrote it in the first person.)
Griffith sends the letter to de Valera the
following day - See Nov-03-21/1
Macardle
says that Barton and Gavan Duffy (and Childers) considered resigning but did
not as they believed the final decision would rest with the cabinet in
Dublin. Gavan Duffy subsequently went
to Dublin to protest to de Valera about only Griffith and Collins negotiating
with the British but de Valera declines to intervene – see Nov-04-21/1.
Comment
|
Curran J M (1980), pg
97; Macardle (1999), pgs
555-556; Pakenham (1967), pgs 162-163
|
|
Nov-02-21/3
|
Arthur Balfour goes to Washington for a naval
conference “lest
his presence in London disrupt the [ongoing] negotiations”. (Fanning suggests that Llyod George was getting Balfour
‘out of the way’.)
Llyod George also tried to get Bonar Law to go
but the latter refused when he learned that Llyod George was to stay behind
to manage the Irish negotiations.
|
Fanning (2013), pgs
54 & 289; Matthews (2004), pg 45
|
|
Nov-03-21/1
|
Griffith
sends his letter to de Valera
Griffith sends a copy of his letter of
November 2nd to de Valera.
He said that he accepted the clause “Free partnership of Ireland with
the other states associated within the British Commonwealth" as it “did
not alter the essence of the formula”.
De Valera passed it onto his cabinet. Pakenham noted that no one
disputed Griffith’s contention that the Empire clause “did not alter the
essence of the formula”. (Pakenham disagrees
– see Comment to Nov-02-21/2.)
Griffith also says that the British were now
satisfied to face the “Ulster” question on what was in the letter and “assure
me that if “Ulster” proves unreasonable they are prepared to rather resign
than use force against us”.
Comment
|
Pakenham (1967), pgs
163-166; Fanning (2013), pg 290; Macardle (1999), pg 557;
Matthews (2004), pgs 44-45
|
|
Nov-03-21/2
|
Birkenhead meets with Griffith and Collins at
11.00am and Birkenhead thanks them for the letter of assurance and says the
British intend to talk to Craig to dissuade him from opposing efforts to
secure Irish unity.
Griffith outlines to de Valera the main
outcomes of this meeting as follows:
(1) The British highly
appreciated the letter as a “document upon which they could deal with Craig”;
(2) That before Craig
was sent for they wished to see Bonar Law and Carson and dissuade them from
opposition and
(3) “if Ulster proved
unreasonable they are prepared to resign rather than use force on us In such
an event no English Government is capable of formation on a war policy
against Ireland”.
(See Nov-03-21/1 for Fanning’s and Pakenham’s
comments on the likelihood of members of the British cabinet resigning.)
|
Curran J M (1980), pgs
97- 98; Pakenham (1967), pg 164
|
|
Nov-03-21/3
|
The London Times
quotes “usually well-informed sources” as saying that “Sinn Féin is prepared
to abandon its claim to independence”.
Kenny says that “the British had ostensibly
leaked a truncated version of Griffith’s letter of 2 November”.
|
Kenny
(2021), pg 68
|
|
Nov-03-21/4
|
George Riddell records in his diary that Llyod
George said that “Sinn Fein are prepared to accept allegiance to the Crown
and agree that Ireland shall remain part of the Empire”.
Riddell goes to write that Llyod George says
that the above is dependent on “Tyrone and Fermanagh being joined to Southern
Ireland, or at any rate a plebiscite, and subject also to Irish fiscal,
postal, telegraphic arrangements being delegated to a central Parliament to
be elected on the basis of population.” Llyod George is quoted as saying that
“The prospect is very awkward”.
|
Pakenham (1967), pg
165
|
|
Nov-03-21/5
|
Macready writes to Wilson saying that it would
be insane to go to war “merely if Ulster objects to a plebiscite in Tyrone
and Fermanagh”.
|
Matthews (2004), pg
45
|
|
Nov-04-21/1
|
Gavan Duffy goes to Dublin (at Barton’s and
Childers’ request) and complains to de Valera about Griffith and Collins
negotiating with the British on their own but de Valera does not intervene.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 557; Curran J M (1980), pg 976
|
|
Nov-05-21/1
|
Llyod George meets with Craig in London in
which he tries to persuade him to have the Northern Ireland parliament
subordinate to an All-Ireland parliament. Craig at first seems
receptive to an All-Ireland parliament.
However, the following day, Craig goes to the
War Office and extracted crucial security concessions from Worthington Evans
(Secretary of State for War) and Henry Wilson (Chief of the Imperial
Staff). Essentially, Craig was given
control of the RIC and the Special Constabulary to maintain order.
After his success at the War Office, Craig
goes to Downing St and rejects any idea of an all-Ireland parliament. He also refuses to countenance any
diminution of the six county area. In this declaration, he is supported
by Carson and Bonar Law. The latter’s support was critical.
Chamberlain told his wife a few days later
that “B. L. is rampaging” and “seeing red on the subject of Ulster”. Chamberlain was also worried about the
loyalty of Tory members of the British Cabinet (such as Curzon, Worthington-Evans
and Baldwin) and concerned that they would side with Bonar Law.
According to Fanning, “A despairing Llyod
George, more depressed than at any time since the conference had begun,
finally accepted that Craig would ‘not budge an inch’; he told Tom Jones to
prepare Griffith and Collins for the break-up of the conference.” This is a very odd statement from Fanning
as there would seem to be no evidence that, at any point, that he was going
to put pressure on Craig especially since he gave away his main card (the
transfer of executive power to the Northern Ireland government) and his
Secretary of State for War (nominally under Llyod George in his cabinet) had
just handed over security powers to the Northern Ireland government. Craig had got nearly everything he wanted
so had no need to make concessions.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 557; Curran J M (1980), pg 99; Phoenix (1994), pg 151;
Fanning (2013), pgs 290-292; Matthews (2004), pgs 45-46; Pakenham (1967), pg
167
|
|
Nov-07-21/1
|
Despite (according to Fanning) his
‘despairing’ state, talking to Tom Jones, Llyod George says that the only
alternative to the breakdown of negotiations and his resignation (as he had
promised Griffith that he would resign if he could not deliver unity) was
Dominion status for the 26 counties and status quo for the six counties with
boundary revisions (via a commission). Craig’s government would retain the
powers granted to it by the Government of Ireland Act as well as
representation in the Imperial parliament. However, it would have to bear a
higher proportion of taxation than the South.
Llyod George charges Jones with finding out
from Collins and Griffith if they would agree to this proposal (which Jones
did the next day) - see Nov-08-21/1.
|
Curran J M (1980), pg
102; Fanning (2013), pg 292; Matthews (2004), pg 46
|
|
Nov-07
|
IRA Volunteer, Henry McKigney,
is accidently shot dead at Fathom Lane, Newry, Co. Down.
|
O’Halpin
and Ó Corráin (2020), pg
535
|
|
Nov-08-21/1
|
Tom Jones puts the idea of a Boundary
Commission to Collins and Griffith as his own idea. Collins does not like it “at all because it
sacrificed unity entirely” but Griffith “was not alarmed”.
Jones also pointed out to Griffith and Collins
that, if Llyod George resigned, Bonar Law might then form a militarist
government which would coerce Southern Ireland. Jones says that he will sound
out Llyod George (on what was the prime minister’s own idea) and get back to
them the next day.
Griffith writes to de Valera saying that the
Boundary Commission would give South most of Tyrone, Fermanagh, and part of
Armagh, Down, etc. He said that Llyod George was asking Craig to choose
between a full Six County area with a parliament subordinate to an
All-Ireland parliament or a sub-division (probably minus Tyrone, Fermanagh,
etc.) with its own parliament [presumably subordinate to Westminster because
Griffith wrote that “Llyod George would give no further powers than what was
possessed under the present Act to the area that remained obdurate after the
boundary Commission had completed its work”].
Griffith also says to de Valera that “We did
not give any definite opinion on the matter. It is their look-out for the
moment. Jones is to see us again tomorrow.” Griffith goes on to say that “the
Conference may end with this week. If
so, all policy dictates that it should end on the note of Ulster being impossibilist in order to throw the Dominions against
her”.
Tom Jones also records in his diary Llyod
George as saying “Curzon, L. W.-E. and Baldwin, they will all go over to
Bonar if the opportunity comes”.
Also, on this day, Lionel Curtis (as Secretary
to the British Delegation) delivered a memorandum to his own side outlining a
way forward – this memo includes the idea of a boundary commission.
|
Macardle
(1999), pgs 557-558; Curran J M (1980), pg 102; Fanning (2013), pgs
293-294; Matthews (2004), pg 46; Kenny (2021), pg 73 and 110-118; Pakenham (1967), pg
168
|
|
Nov-08-21/2
|
Authorities relax curfew restrictions in
Belfast – curfew to start at 11.30pm
|
Parkinson (2004), pg 167
|
|
Nov-09-21/1
|
Transfer of Powers to NI Government
A transfer of executive power to the Northern
Ireland government under section 69 of the Government of Ireland Act 1920
takes places by means of two orders in council made by the British king. This was to come into effect on November 22nd
– See Nov-22-21/2.
Quoting McColgan, Fanning says “ ‘Partition
was now legally complete’ and Llyod George’s room for manoeuvre in his
dealings with the Northern Ireland government correspondingly
diminished”.
Question
|
Fanning (2013), pg
288
|
|
Nov-09-21/2
|
De Valera (who had not written to the Irish
delegation since October 30th) writes back to Griffith
acknowledging the move to isolate the unionists and how ‘admirably’ the
delegation had managed to ensure that any possible breakdown would focus on
Ulster’s position rather than on Sinn Féin’s objections to the new state
being bound to the British Empire and British Crown.
However, he warns against giving any further
ground on the ‘Crown and Empire’ connection. He writes “The danger is now
that we shall be tempted, in order to put them more hopelessly in the wrong,
to make further advances on our side. I think, that as far as Crown-Empire
connection is concerned, we should not budge a single inch from the point to
which the negotiations have now led us.”
De Valera makes no mention of the Boundary
Commission which Griffith had wrote to him about the previous day
(Nov-08-21/1) – perhaps he had not received the letter. Griffith writes again to de Valera about
the Boundary Commission idea on November 9th – see Nov-09-21/3.
See also Nov-11-21/3.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 559; Kenny (2021), pgs 70-71; Pakenham
(1967), pgs 168-169
|
|
Nov-09-21/3
|
Jones meets with Griffith and Duggan at the
Grosvenor Hotel.
Jones tells them that Llyod George was going
to secure cabinet approval against Ulster the next day but before he did he
wanted to play ‘one absolutely last card’.
He wanted to put to Craig the proposal of a
boundary commission (which Jones had spoken to Griffith and Collins about on
November 8th) and if the unionists refused this offer then
they could be portrayed as unreasonable in trying to coerce areas that had
majorities that wished to be under a Dublin government.
Jones also pointed out to Griffith that, what
remained of Northern Ireland (after the work of a boundary commission) would find
itself handcuffed by the terms of the 1920 Act (and “would have to bear
itself its proportion of British taxation”). Jones asked Griffith and
Duggan if they would stand behind such a proposal, if Ulster accepted.
According to Jones, Griffith replied that “It
is not our proposal, but if the Prime Minister cares to make it we would not
make his position impossible. We cannot give him a pledge but we will not
turn him down on it. He are not going
to queer his pitch. We would prefer a plebiscite, but in essentials a
Boundary Commission is very much the same.
It would not have to be for Fermanagh and Tyrone only but for the six
counties.”
On the evening of November 9th,
Griffith wrote to de Valera informing him that “Llyod George proposes … a
Boundary Commission to delimit the six county area be established so as to
give us the districts in which we are a majority. … The move was a tactical
one to deprive “Ulster” of support in England by showing it was utterly
unreasonable in insisting to coerce areas that wished to get out. He asked if
we would stand behind such a proposal. We said that it would be their
proposal – not ours, and we would not, therefore, be bound by it but we
realised the value as a tactical manoeuvre and if Llyod George made it we
would not queer his position.”
Pakenham says by agreeing not to queer his
pitch, Griffith had “released Llyod George from his obligation to secure an
all-Ireland Parliament or resign.
Llyod George was making light of the grip which had cost Griffith so
much to fasten him on”.
When Llyod George heard back from Jones on his
conversation with Griffith and Duggan, it increased his optimism. Llyod
George called a meeting of the British delegation on the morning of
November10th – See Nov-10-21/2.
However, Jones recorded in his diary that
Llyod George insisted that a boundary commission must cover all nine Ulster
counties - See Nov-10-21/3.
|
Curran J M (1980), pgs
103-104; Fanning
(2013), pg 294; Matthews
(2004), pg 46-47; Kenny (2021), pgs
73-74; Pakenham (1967), pgs 169-171
|
|
Nov-09-21/4
|
BA soldier, Albert Sargent, dies after being
kicked by a horse in the Curragh, Co. Kildare.
|
O’Halpin
and Ó Corráin (2020), pg
556
|
|
Nov-10-21/1
|
Having left Hamburg on October 28th,
Charlie McGuinness sailed the Frieda
into Waterford Harbour.
He had got held up by bad weather and fog near
Helvick Head.
This meant that he couldn’t give the agreed signal.
He moored the Frieda behind an island and rowed ashore. He went in search of local Sinn Féin
leader, Dr Vincent White.
After a bit of convincing, White accompanied
McGuinness to view the cargo of the Frieda. White then organised to have the cargo
unloaded and sent a message to Pax Whelan who sent cars to pick up the guns
and ammunition and bring them to Keatings of Kilrossanty
in the Comeragh mountains.
From Keatings, they were distributed to the
Southern and Midlands Divisions of the IRA.
|
McCarthy (2015), pgs 93-94
|
|
Nov-10-21/2
|
Bonar Law meets with Llyod George early in the
morning of November 10th.
Bonar Law tells him that he could not coerce
Ulster and save the Liberal-Conservative Coalition at the same time. Instead, he recommends to Llyod George
“Don’t confine your bullying to Ulster.
Try it on the Sinn Feiners too.”
He says to Llyod George that he should tell
the Irish delegation that he has been unable to win any concessions from
Craig and invite them to accept dominion government in the “knowledge that it
would be in Ulster’s material interest eventually to join with the
South”. (Why exactly Bonar Law thought
that it would be in their material interest is not made clear.)
The British delegation meets later in the
morning. According to Curran, Llyod
George tables a draft letter to Craig which tries to introduce financial
disadvantages for the Unionists if they stay out of an all-Ireland parliament
but the Tory unionists on the delegation (such as Worthington-Evans and
Chamberlain) were having none of it.
The former said that “Ulster was to get all her powers under the 1920
Act and therefore there could be no change in the matter of finance.” Chamberlain complained about the use of
florid language in the draft letter and said to Llyod George “we were now not
writing to Celts but Anglo-Saxons”.
The draft letter to Craig was revised. It
explained the settlement towards which the British Government had been
working. It said that the settlement
envisaged had, as a first principle, that Ireland had an explicit allegiance
to the Throne and that it was a member of the Empire. It also envisaged an all-Ireland Parliament
and asked Craig to come into conference.
The letter was shown to the British cabinet in
the afternoon. After the cabinet
meeting, Llyod George sent the letter to Craig.
See Nov-11-21/1 for Craig’s reply.
|
Fanning (2013), pgs 295-296; Curran J M (1980), pg 100;
Matthews (2004), pgs 47-51; Boyce (1972), pg 159; Pakenham (1967), pg
171-173
|
|
Nov-10-21/3
|
As seen above (Nov-09-21/3), Griffith insisted
that Llyod George’s proposal for a boundary commission must cover all six
counties and not just Fermanagh and Tyrone. As also noted, Llyod George
was pleased when Jones reported to him on the evening of November 9th
about his conversation with Griffith and Duggan but Jones recorded in his
diary that Llyod George insisted that a boundary commission must cover all
nine Ulster counties.
After a late night meeting of the truce
committee on November 10th, Jones informed Duggan the next day that Llyod
George had in mind that “a Boundary Commission should apply not only to the 6
Counties only but to the 9 Counties of Ulster”. According to Jones, Duggan did not
object. Jones also says that he asked Duggan to tell this piece of
information to Griffith. (Kenny notes
that “It is not known if Duggan did so”.)
Jones also claimed, in his diary, that he
informed Griffith that the commission would cover all nine Ulster counties
(i.e. could add to as well as subtract territory from Northern Ireland). However, Griffith does not mention this in
his correspondence over the next few days with de Valera.
|
Kenny (2021), pg 74
|
|
Nov-11-21/1
|
IRA Volunteer, Daniel Clancy, who was interned
in Spike Island dies of appendicitis in the Central Medical Hospital in
Cork. His parents maintain that his
illness arose from the brutal treatment that he received.
|
O’Halpin
and Ó Corráin (2020), pg
535; O’Farrell (1997), pg 103 & 105
|
|
Nov-11-21/2
|
Craig, after consulting his Northern Ireland
cabinet, replies to Llyod George’s letter of November 10th
rejecting coming under an All-Ireland parliament and rejecting any revision
of the Six County boundaries.
He says (according to Griffith) that “So long
as the suggestion of the [British] Government contains a reference to the
establishment of an all-Ireland Parliament, they feel it would be impossible
for them to meet in conference on the subject”
Also, Craig proposes that the North as well as
the South be given Dominion status on a basis of equality with the South
(without explicitly saying Dominion status). The latter meant, of
course, the end of the United Kingdom. But the Unionists were willing to see
this as they seen “the loss of representation at Westminster as less evil
than inclusion in an All-Ireland Parliament”.
See Nov-14-21/2.
(Macardle says
November 12th – it would appear from Pakenham that Craig sent a short reply
on November 11th and the detailed reply on the 12th –
it will be referred to as Craig’s letter of November 12th.)
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 560; Curran J M (1980), pg 101 & 105; Fanning (2013), pg
296; Matthews (2004), pgs 48-48; Boyce (1972), pg 160; Pakenham (1967), pgs
171-173
|
|
Nov-11-21/3
|
Griffith replies to de Valera’s letter of
November 9th.
He tells de Valera of Llyod George letter to
Craig of November 10th and also of Craig’s reply (see
Nov-11-21/2). He says that “The
‘Ulster’ crowd are in the pit that they digged for
us, and if we keep them there we’ll have England and the Dominions out
against them in the next week or two”.
He also informs de Valera that Chamberlain was
to speak in favour of an Irish settlement at the forthcoming National
Unionist conference in Liverpool on November 17th and
reported that Chamberlain had said the previous evening that the Irish
delegation were “straightforward, honourable men” whose word he was ready to
take.
|
Curran J M (1980), pg
105 & 310; Pakenham (1967), pgs 172-173
|
|
Nov-12-21/1
|
Collins writes to de Valera saying that “No
progress has been made since last weekend”.
Andy Cope advises the Irish delegation that
there would be no progress until after the Conservative Party conference in
Liverpool on November 17th.
|
Fanning (2013), pg
296
|
|
Nov-12-21/2
|
Bonar Law in a letter to the editor of The
Scotsman says he would resist British Government attempts to coerce
Ulster and that he felt that Ulster was as much part of Britain as
Scotland.
Basically, his position was that if Ulster is
not forced into an all-Ireland parliament then Sinn Féin can govern their
“own part of Ireland” as they please as long as they “form a constitution
within the Empire and behave decently to Protestants there and make no
attempt against Ulster”.
Subsequently Bonar Law met with Llyod George
and was sufficiently reassured to abandon any thoughts of leading a revolt at
the Liverpool meeting.
|
Curran J M (1980), pg
99; Fanning (2013), pgs 296-298
|
|
Nov-12-21/3
|
Jones and Griffith meet in the morning at 22
Hans Place.
In the afternoon, Llyod George and Griffith meet
for lunch in the house of Llyod George’s parliamentary private secretary
Philip Sassoon at 25 Park Lane.
Griffith is shown (or, according to Pakenham
given a ‘hurried’ reading of) the Llyod George – Craig correspondence of
November 10th and 11th/12th. Griffith later says that he understood that
all members of the British Cabinet were astounded at Craig’s proposal that
Northern Ireland should be made a Dominion and should pay none except
voluntary contributions to England.
Llyod George now says that, after Craig’s
refusal to join an all-Ireland state under any circumstance, he wishes to
make a proposal to Craig that there would be an all-Ireland Parliament but
that Ulster would have the right to remove itself from its jurisdiction.
However, if Northern Ireland chose to withdraw, then a boundary commission
would delimit its area to make the boundary conform as closely as possible to
the wishes of the population.
He also said that the part that remains after
the Commission would be “subject to equal financial burdens as England”.
Llyod George asked Griffith if he would refrain from repudiating it.
Griffith gave him this assurance.
Llyod George also extracted an assurance from
Griffith not to embarrass him at a major meeting of the National Unionist
Association on November 17th in Liverpool by not repudiating
him.
Tom Jones quickly embodied Griffith’s
undertaking in a short memorandum – see Nov-13-21/1.
Fanning says that “Llyod George was later to
use [this memorandum] to devastating effect in the dying hours of the
negotiations” - see Dec-05-21/3
Comment
|
Macardle
(1999), pgs 561-562; Curran J M (1980), pg 106; Fanning (2013), pg 296;
Matthews (2004), pg 51; Kenny (2021), pgs 75-76
|
|
Nov-13-21/1
|
Jones shows Griffith a summary of the
proposals he had agreed to with Llyod George the day before and Griffith
verbally assented to them after quickly skimming the document. (It
would seem that Griffith did not mention this document to his colleagues in
the delegation or to de Valera.)
Matthews says that “Although the document
confirmed that Northern Ireland would be subject to taxation if it opted out
of a single Irish State, the Boundary Commission outlined in this memorandum
was altogether different from the one he had now discussed with the British
on several occasions. As described
here, the tribunal would ‘revise’ the Irish boundary and would ‘adjust the
line by both inclusion and exclusion … That was a far cry from a commission
set up to ‘delimit’ the six-county state”.
Phoenix comments that “through this stratagem
Llyod George had effectively pre-empted any future attempt by the Irish
delegates to stage a ‘break’ on the partition issue". Chamberlain wrote to his wife that the
document meant that the Irish would not break off negotiations over
partition.
|
Curran J M (1980), pg
107; Phoenix (1994), pg 151; Matthews (2004), pg 52
|
|
Nov-14-21/1
|
At the GAA Louth county junior final between
Boyne Rangers of Drogheda and Clan na Gaels from
Dundalk, rival groups of IRA men pull weapons on each other twice during the
game.
The Chief of the Republican Police in the area
described it as “very discreditable to the national movement in the area”.
|
Hall (2019), pg 87
|
|
Nov-14-21/2
|
Llyod George writes to Craig reiterating his desire
for an unconditional conference or, at least, engage in personal
consultations with himself. Llyod
George also argued against Craig’s idea of establishing two Dominions in
Ireland. Craig replies on November 17th
– see Nov-17-21/1.
Tom Jones writes in his diary that Llyod George told his
colleagues that “we are after a settlement - that [is] our objective”.
According to Matthews, Llyod George wanted a settlement
because it would be turned “into a pretext for calling a general
election. This in turn could provide a
springboard from which to launch his long-desired Centre Party.”.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 563; Curran (1980), pg
101; Matthews (2004), pg 41; Pakenham (1967), pg 172
|
|
Nov-14-21/3
|
In his diaries, Mark Sturgis refers to
Fermanagh and Tyrone as the Alsace-Lorraine of the Irish Question.
|
Matthews (2004), pg
5
|
|
Nov-14-21/4
|
BA soldier, Cecil Barton, dies as a result of
an accidental shooting in Co. Cavan.
|
O’Halpin
and Ó Corráin (2020), pg
556
|
|
Nov-15-21/1
|
The Dáil cabinet approves the second external
loan “to enable the Irish Republic to function, to preserve its integrity and
to achieve its recognition”. Twenty million dollars was to be raised.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 565
|
|
Nov-15-21/2
|
Trial starts in Belfast of seven IRA men
accused of abducting and holding as a prisoner a Protestant man called Arthur
Hunt.
The resultant publicity is very bad for IRA.
|
McDermott (2001), pgs
121-124
|
|
Nov-16-21/1
|
A group of Southern Unionists (Earl of
Midleton, Dr Bernard (Provost of Trinity) & Andrew Johnson) meet with
Griffith and he promises that he would recommend safeguards for their
interests.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 564
|
|
Nov-16-21/2
|
British send a draft treaty to the Irish
delegation.
It offered dominion status (close to Canada
but with special provisions). Along with relatively uncontested trade,
finances and security provisions, Northern Ireland could exclude itself
within one year. If it did, a boundary commission would revise the current
border in accordance with “the wishes of the inhabitants”.
Also, if it did exclude itself “the provisions
of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920 … shall continue to be of full force
and effect”. (According to Matthews,
this meant that “the six counties would pay British rates of taxation and a
proportion of imperial debt”.)
Griffith sends a copy to de Valera saying that
he thought the terms should be rejected. The British were informed that
the Irish side would shortly submit counter proposals. See Nov-22-21/1.
(Fanning says that the British document was “a reiteration
of the restrictive reservations in their proposals of July 20th coupled with
a formulation of what Llyod George had agreed with Griffith about Northern
Ireland”.)
|
Curran J M (1980), pg
109; Fanning (2013), pg 299; Matthews (2004), pg 53; Pakenham (1967), pg 172
|
|
Nov-16-21/3
|
Brugha,
as Minister of Defence, writes to Mulcahy, as IRA Chief-of-Staff, saying that
there would be fresh commissions issued to officers and offers of
re-enlistment to all ranks. The reason
he gave was that renewed fighting was a possibility and that it was necessary
“to put the Army in an unequivocal position as the legal defence force of the
Nation under the control of the Civil Government”.
Before he accepted a fresh commission as Chief
of Staff, Mulcahy wanted clarity on the issue of who had the power to make
appointments to GHQ - that such appointments should not be “made against his
judgement and without his concurrence”.
Brugha
replied that, while his advice would be considered, all appointments will be
made by the “Cabinet on the recommendations of the Minister of Defence”.
A meeting is called between Cabinet and GHQ to
resolve this and related issues on November 25th – see
Nov-16-21/4.
|
Townshend (2014), pg 329
|
|
Nov-17-21/1
|
Craig replies to Llyod George saying, once
again, that Northern Ireland would not agree to come under an Irish national
government. He again requested dominion status for Northern
Ireland.
However, he did say that he would meet with
Llyod George any time after November 21st. However, Craig caught influenza and his
meeting with Llyod George did not happen until some time
after November 21st.
See Nov-29-21/2.
|
Macardle
(1999), pgs 563; Curran J M (1980), pg 101; Pakenham (1967), pg 172
|
|
Nov-17-21/2
|
There is a large conference of unionists (and conservatives)
from all over Great Britain and Ireland.
It takes place in Liverpool.
A resolution denouncing the British Government
for negotiating with Sinn Féin is defeated. Salisbury reported that
there was a “very strong desire to avoid civil war and a general wish not to
break up the Irish Conference until everything had been tried to secure peace
with honour”.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 564-565; Fanning (2013), pgs 298-299
|
|
Nov-17-21/3
|
De Valera writes to Griffith saying that it
was time to send the British their final word and this could best be done by
presenting Draft Treaty A suitably modified.
|
Curran J M (1980), pg
109
|
|
Nov-17-21/4
|
At a ceremony in Dublin, de Valera is
inaugurated as Chancellor of the National University of Ireland.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 566
|
|
Nov17-21/5
|
The Irish Bulletin publishes an
internal memo from Lt Col Charles Wickham (RIC Commissioner) to all City and County
heads of the USC proposing that ex-servicemen be brought into the USC to be
used in a grave emergency.
|
McDermott (2001), pg
124
|
|
Nov-18-21/1
|
A circular from Tudor (Chief of Police) to his
Deputy Inspector General, the Divisional Commissioner in Belfast, and the
Commandant of the Auxiliary Division states that the RIC "stationed in
the six counties will not be handed over at present but will be placed as
from November 22nd at the disposal of the Northern
Government". See Nov-22-21/2.
The RIC and Special Constables were handed
over but no mention is made of the Auxiliaries.
Memo given in Abbott (2019), pgs 343-344.
|
Abbott (2000), pgs
269-270; Parkinson
(2004), pg 90
|
|
Nov-18-21/2
|
Memorandum
from Warren Fisher
In a memo to Austen Chamberlain and Llyod
George, referring to the decision to declare Dáil Éireann (see Sep-10-19/1)
and Sinn Féin illegal, Warren Fisher, Permanent Secretary to the British
Treasury, writes “in the course of 1919 Lord French, Mr Macpherson, Sir John
Taylor, Mr E. Saunderson … and Mr Watt had convinced themselves that the only
cure for the (then) sporadic and infrequent exhibitions of force in Ireland
was the total excommunication of Sinn Fein … The fact that Sinn Fein was a
political creed … escaped the notice of these gentlemen. They merely regarded it as a convertible
term with the physical force faction … they decided that the Irish problem
would be settled if the majority of the people in Ireland were forbidden to
think, discuss, talk, write or speak the political views which they favoured.
In high places in Ireland there were some – not many – of whom Sir Joseph
Byrne [Inspector General of the RIC at the time and one of the few Catholics
in ‘high places’] was one, who realised the full implications of
‘proclaiming’, that is proscribing in its entirety, a political creed. No attention was paid to their warnings
that such a procedure would reinforce indefinitely the physical force party,
and would justify their methods as the only instrument left to them”.
For background on Warren Fisher, see
Apr-18-20/1 and May-12-20/1.
|
O’Halpin
(1987), pg 190
|
|
Nov-19 to 20-21/1
|
According to Parkinson, riots break out in the
east side of Belfast and in the York St area on November 19th.
There are disturbances in the Ballymacarrett area the following day.
See Nov-21 to 25-21/1.
|
Parkinson (2004), pg 168
|
|
Nov-20-21/1
|
Craig writes to Llyod George asking if Sinn Féin
“was prepared to give allegiance to the Crown without reservation … or
whether their consent to do so is still withheld and made dependent on your
first having procured the consent of Ulster to an All-Ireland Parliament”.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 565
|
|
Nov-21 to 25-21/1
|
Major
disturbances in Belfast
O’Halpin
and Ó Corráin record 32 deaths in Belfast during
this period caused by the riots and disturbances. Seventeen were Protestants and fifteen were
Catholics. (One of the Protestants
died from injuries received during the summer but another Protestant – not
included in the 32 - dies on December 2nd from injuries that he received on
November 23rd.)
Abbott says that, between November 19th
and 25th, 27 people are killed in Belfast.
More
Detail
|
Parkinson (2004), pgs 168-170; Abbott (2000), pgs 274-275;
McDermott (2001), pgs 125-132; O’Halpin
and Ó Corráin (2020), pgs
536-539 & 539-540; Parkinson (2020), pg 161
|
|
Nov-22-21/1
|
The Irish delegation in London send a new
memorandum to the British delegation (in response to the British draft treaty
of November 16th – see Nov-16-21/2). In effect, it is an outline treaty. The full text of this memorandum is given
as Appendix 18 in Macardle. It was mostly prepared
by Childers but presented as Barton’s to avoid incurring Griffith’s
wrath.
With regards to Northern Ireland, the
memorandum states “in the event of the existing legislature in the North East
of Ireland accepting its position under the National Parliament, Ireland will
confirm the legislature in its existing powers and will undertake to provide
the safeguards designed to secure any special interests of the area over
which it functions”,
Thomas Jones comes to meet Griffith and
Collins in 22 Hans Place in the afternoon saying that the new memorandum had
filled Llyod George with despair.
He says that he was to ask them “Are they in
the Empire or are they out? Are we to control Naval defence or are we
not? … Where are the safeguards for
Ulster? Do they accept or do they not
safeguards enumerated on Friday and of which Griffith made a note?”.
Jones went on to say that if the memorandum
was not withdrawn or explained away then Llyod George would have no option
but to break off negotiations.
Griffith and Collins tell Jones that they would consider his messages
with the rest of their delegation.
See Nov-23-21/2.
|
Macardle
(1999), pgs 568-569; Fanning (2013), pgs 300-301; Matthews (2004), pg
54
|
|
Nov-22-21/2
|
Responsibility for security, law and order and
the administration of justice is transferred from Westminster to the Northern
Ireland Government.
In the previous weeks, a new Protestant
paramilitary group – the Imperial Guards – appeared on the streets of
Belfast. It would appear that it was
made up mainly of ex-BA soldiers and ex-UVF. Craig was able to use their appearance to
press the British government to bring back the USC.
McCluskey says that after the transfer of
security powers, the NI Minister of Home Affairs, Dawson Bates, “virtually
gave the USC [Ulster Special Constabulary] immunity from prosecution”.
For the issue as to who would pay for the USC
- see Dec-12-21/2.
|
Parkinson (2004), pg 169;
McDermott (2001), pg 120 & 125; Grant (2018), pg 126; McCluskey (2014), pg
100; Phoenix (1994), pg
152
|
|
Nov-22-21/3
|
McCarthy says 45 IRA prisoners tunnel their
way out of Kilkenny prison. No attempt
is made to re-capture them. (Walsh says 43 prisoners escaped and gives a
detailed account of how they did it.)
|
McCarthy (2015), pg
80; Walsh (2018), pgs 135-141
|
|
Nov-23-21/1
|
Chamberlain talks to Bonar Law and explains
the British delegation’s proposals.
When Law is convinced that Ulster would not be
forced under an All-Ireland parliament then he said he would advise Craig and
Carson that they could not expect the British Government to fight to protect
the six county boundary.
It is clear, however, that Law thinks the
Boundary Commission would only make minor modifications.
|
Curran J M (1980), pg
109 & 311
|
|
Nov-23-21/2
|
Fanning says that Llyod George, Birkenhead and
Chamberlain met with Griffith, Collins and Barton in the morning in Downing
St at which both sides pulled back from the brink of the previous day (see
Nov-22-21/1) and there was a discussion which cleared the air. (However, Fanning does not say what, if
anything was agreed.) See Nov-24-21/1.
Macardle
says that at a conference of the Irish and British delegations, advance was
made on the issues on trade and defence. It would appear that these
issues, as well as finance would not be impediments to an agreement.
According to Kenny, Griffith reported to de Valera on this
day saying that “On Ulster … I had assured him [i.e. Llyod George] that I
would not let him down … I said that I had given him that assurance and I now
repeated it, but I told him that it was his proposal … not ours … He was
satisfied. He had misunderstood us in this instance and said as much.”
Kenny says that this reference on November 23rd
“to an earlier ‘assurance’ appears to be to their discussion of 12 November.
As already seen, Griffith’s verbal assurance on that day, like his earlier
written ‘personal assurances’ on 2 November, had been carefully qualified.”.
|
Macardle (1999), pg
572; Fanning (2013), pg 302; Kenny (2021), pg 76
|
|
Nov-23-21/3
|
William Cosgrave sends a rebuke to the Sinn
Féin controlled Meath County council for firing a nurse, not for professional
incompetence but for her Redmondite politics and snobbish attitude towards
Sinn Féiners.
According to Garvin, this is an example of
Cosgrave seeing the need to accommodate non-Sinn Féin supporters in the new
state.
|
Garvin (1996), pg 72
|
|
Nov-23-21/4
|
Tadgh Barry, C Company, 1st
Battalion, Cork No. 1 Brigade, IRA and an Alderman on Cork City Council, who
is a prisoner, is killed by a sentry in Ballykinlar
Internment Camp in Co. Down.
(O’Farrell and O’Halpin
& Ó Corráin say that this killing occurred on
November 15th and McDermott says it was before November 17th.)
|
O'Kelly in The Kerryman
(1955), pg 26; Gallagher (1953), pg 225; McDermott (2001), pg
124; O’Farrell
(1997), pg 102; O’Halpin and Ó Corráin (2020), pgs 535-536
|
|
Nov-24-21/1
|
There is a conference of the Irish and British
negotiators in the House of Lords with Birkenhead and (attorney general)
Gordon Hewart on the British side and Griffith and Collins, accompanied by
George Gavan Duffy and John Chartres, on the Irish side.
The question of the Irish recognition of the
Crown was discussed. The Irish delegates said that there could be no question
of allegiance but they undertook to prepare a formula outlining the extent to
which they would recognise the Crown. See Nov-25-21/4.
The Irish delegates returned to Dublin on the
night of November 24th.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 572; Fanning (2013), pg
28
|
|
Nov-25-21/2
|
According to Macardle,
violence breaks out in Belfast leading, over the next four days, to 26 people
killed and 94 people injured. [However, it is likely that Macardle has got the dates wrong for this outbreak of
violence and it should have been November 21st for the outbreak of
voilence– see Nov-21 to 25-21/1.]
Macardle
says that the death toll from violence in Belfast since July 1st
stands at 174.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 575
|
|
Nov-25-21/3
|
The Dáil orders the updating of the electoral
register.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 565
|
|
Nov-25-21/4
|
Meeting between the Dáil Cabinet and IRA GHQ
to try to resolve issue of who had the power to appoint members of GHQ Staff
and related issues. (See Nov-16-21/3.)
However, Eoin O’Duffy
took shrill umbrage at what he seen as being demoted and replaced by Austen
Stack as deputy chief of staff.
De Valera “rose excitedly in his chair … and
declared in a half-scream, half-shout ‘ye may mutiny if ye like, but Ireland
will give me another army’ and dismissed the whole lot of us from his sight.
The key issue was left unresolved. In effect, the status quo ante remained but as Townshend says “de Valera’s use
of the word ‘mutiny’ was ominous”.
Garvin notes that Griffith and Collins were not present for this
meeting.
Regan’s view of this meeting is insightful. He
says that this meeting was an attempt by “de Valera’s revolutionary Dáil
government” to “renegotiate its relationship with the IRA by issuing new
commissions under its authority. … The resulting clash, on 25 November 1921,
between the staff officers of IRA general headquarters and the civilian
government’s authority prefigured later civil-military conflicts leading
eventually to the civil war in June 1922. O’Duffy
and de Valera ended the meeting shouting across a conference room at one
another. … the defiance of government authority was, as de Valera claimed at
the time, tantamount to mutiny. O’Duffy may have spoken loudest, but he did not speak
alone. The IRA cadre marching out with him formed the treatyite
army’s elite in 1922, and was led by Collins.
Its relationship to civil authority remained unresolved, complex, and
poisonous to any assumption that power would in future reside with the
civilians rather than the soldiers.”
|
Townshend (2014), pg 330; Garvin (1996), pg 56; Ferriter
(2021), pgs 89-90
|
|
Nov-28-21/1
|
A Memorandum on External Association is
presented by the Irish delegation to the British.
The formula read “Ireland will agree to be
associated with the British Commonwealth for all purposes of common concern,
including defence, peace and war, and political treaties, and to recognise
the British Crown as Head of the Association as the symbol and accepted head
of the combination of Associated States”.
See Nov-29-21/1
That evening at Chequers, Griffith and Duggan
meet Llyod George, Birkenhead and Robert Horne (who was Chancellor of the
Exchequer). The British say that the Irish proposals are
impossible. Following discussion, the British agreed that functions of
the “Crown in Ireland should be no more in practice than in Canada or any
Dominion”. The Irish were invited to devise the formulation.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 573; Fanning (2013), pg
303
|
|
Nov-28-21/2
|
After British government decision to hand over
responsibility for local government to Northern Ireland Ministry of Home
Affairs (see Nov-22-21/2), Fermanagh and Tyrone County Councils pledges their
allegiance to Dáil Eireann. Eight smaller public bodies follow.
On same day the NI Minister of Home Affairs,
Dawson Bates, brings in a bill in the NI parliament which allowed him to
dissolve any local authority.
See Dec-01-21/3.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 574; Curran J M (1980), pg 102; Phoenix (1994), pgs
152-153; McCluskey (2014), pg 105
|
|
Nov-29-21/1
|
The British delegation meet at 3.00pm to
discuss oath of allegiance.
At 4.00pm, Llyod George, Chamberlain and
Birkenhead meet with Griffith, Collins and Duggan in Downing St and the
British agree to put a phrase in the Treaty ensuring that the Crown should
have no more authority in Ireland than in Canada.
The British delegation also tell Griffith that
they intended to have their final proposals ready within a week and to send
them to the Irish Delegation and Craig on December 6th. Griffith got a
promise that he would have them (informally) by December 1st. (He was to get
them on the evening of November 30th.)
He wrote to de Valera saying that he would
come to Dublin on December 2nd and asked for a cabinet meeting on
December 3rd. He said “I shall return to Dublin on Friday
morning [2nd December] and hope to see you that evening. Please
have a cabinet meeting arranged for Saturday morning, when we shall be all
there. I intend to return to London on that evening.”
(During this time Childers was writing reports
for the Irish delegation analysing the position of the other Dominions
especially Canada – he made unfavourable comparisons with what had already
been conceded by the Irish delegation and this angered Griffith.)
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 573; Kenny (2021), pg
83
|
|
Nov-29-21/2
|
After returning from London and talks with
Llyod George, Craig says to the NI parliament that “By Tuesday next [6th
December] either the negotiations [between the British and Irish delegations]
will have broken down or the Prime Minister [Llyod George] will send me new
proposals for consideration by the [NI] Cabinet. In the meantime the rights
of Ulster will be in no way sacrificed or compromised.”
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 574; Curran J M (1980), pg 101; Kenny (2021), pg 83;
Pakenham (1967), pg 172
|
|
Nov-29-21/3
|
A bomb is thrown into Keegan St, in the
nationalist Markets area of Belfast, killing a Catholic Annie McNamara (48).
|
Parkinson (2004), pg 173; O’Halpin and Ó Corráin (2020), pg 539
|
|
Nov-30-21/1
|
Speaking to the Mid-Clare Brigade IRA, de
Valera said “We are going to stand on the rock of truth and principle.
…. We know the terrorism, we know the savagery that can be used against us,
and we defy it.”
He had spent this week, along with Cathal Brugha, reviewing IRA contingents in Limerick, Galway and
Clare. Preparations were being made in case of a breakdown in the
negotiations.
|
Macardle
(1999), pg 575
|
|
Nov-30-21/2
|
A Protestant, Alexander Reid (48 or 61), is
shot dead on his way to work on the Ormeau Road (or at the junction of Cromac and Catherine Streets) in Belfast. The RIC think that this killing may have
been in reprisal for the killing of Annie McNamara on November 29th.
|
Parkinson (2004), pg 173; O’Halpin and Ó Corráin (2020), pg 549
|
|
Nov-30-21/3
|
The Belfast Telegraph reports Craig as
blaming Sinn Féin in the NI Parliament for the recent violence and informed
them that 700 ‘A’ Specials and 5,000 ‘B’ Specials would be enrolled
immediately.
Around this time, Wickham, Divisional Commissioner
of the RIC in the North, orders his men to regard the truce as non-existent.
|
McDermott (2001), pgs
140-141
|